Domain 1 of 4 · Chapter 3 of 3

Implement incident response techniques

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Included in this chapter:

  • Plans, playbooks, and the communication plan
  • Defining roles, authority, and escalation
  • Training with tabletop exercises and simulations
  • Log collection for an investigation
  • Log correlation
  • Log augmentation and enrichment
  • Alerts, notifications, and triage
  • Determining severity and impact
  • Prioritizing competing incidents
  • Establishing the incident timeline
  • Gathering and preserving evidence
  • Isolating affected targets
  • Remediation and verification
  • Performing restoration
  • Release from isolation
  • Root cause analysis
  • Corrective action development
  • Closing the incident

Isolation choices: host network isolation vs segment-level isolation vs power down vs access-path containment

Decision factorHost network isolationSegment-level isolationPower downAccess-path containment
Use whenOne or a few devices can be disconnected by available meansSeveral systems or subnets are affected and host-by-host disconnection is too slowA spreading device cannot be disconnected by any other meansAccounts, VPN, single sign-on, or other remote access paths are compromised
What it stopsThe device's network traffic, on every path (wired and wireless)Spread across the switch or segmentAll activity on the deviceUse of the stolen credentials through the affected accounts, services, and access paths that are disabled or restricted
Live evidence (memory, running state)Available for authorized collection, but live state may changeAvailable on devices that stay powered, but live state may changeLostNo power-off loss of memory; access restrictions may change live sessions
Typical mistakeUnplugging Ethernet while Wi-Fi stays connectedCutting a segment without the authority the incident response policy assignsUsing it by default when disconnection was possibleIsolating only the user's laptop after credential theft

Decision tree

Several systems or subnetsaffected?YesNoSegment-level isolationswitch or segment offlineCan the device be cut off onevery path (wired and Wi-Fi)?YesHost network isolationkeep it powered for collectionNoCan its network segmentbe taken offline?YesNoPower downlast resort; memory evidence lostAlways: credentials or remote access stolen? Add access-path containment.

Cheat sheet

  • The response plan must establish authority and decision criteria
  • Playbooks turn response arrangements into actionable scenario steps
  • The communication plan specifies who receives which updates and when
  • Suspected compromise of normal communications calls for out-of-band coordination
  • Responders need access to plans when normal systems are unavailable
  • Incident response and business continuity plans must work together
  • An incident lead coordinates response ownership and status
  • High-impact response actions require the authority assigned in the plan
  • Specialized incident issues belong with the appropriate organizational function
  • Provider involvement does not remove the need to define response responsibilities
  • Escalation should address the specific capability or authority the incident lacks
  • Tabletop exercises test decisions and coordination through discussion
  • Response simulations test the performance of operational duties
  • Incident training should match each participant's responsibilities
  • Exercise results should drive changes to plans and training
  • Log collection should include the sources that can establish the relevant activity
  • Protected centralized logs reduce dependence on compromised hosts
  • Short-lived logs may require immediate preservation
  • Enabling logging after an incident does not recreate earlier events
  • Missing telemetry can indicate a collection failure rather than a quiet system
  • Collected logs require confidentiality as well as integrity protection
  • Correlation links evidence from different sources into a related sequence
  • Consistent event fields make cross-source correlation reliable
  • Interaction identifiers can link events more precisely than time alone
  • Threat enrichment adds intelligence context to observed artifacts
  • Asset enrichment connects a technical alert to its business context
  • External context must be assessed for relevance and trustworthiness
  • Triage establishes the initial validity and urgency of a reported incident
  • Functional impact depends on the business services affected
  • Serious data impact can exist while services remain available
  • Incident priorities should reflect risk and urgency rather than arrival order
  • Recoverability affects response strategy and resource allocation
  • Alerts must reach an accountable responder through the defined workflow
  • Timeline comparisons require a consistent time reference
  • Event time and collection time can describe different moments
  • A defensible timeline separates attacker activity from responder changes
  • Chronological order alone does not establish causation
  • Chain of custody accounts for evidence possession and handling
  • Hash comparisons help verify that acquired evidence has not changed
  • Analyze evidence copies while preserving the original material
  • Evidence acquisition must account for volatility
  • Investigators must establish authority to collect from each source
  • A legal hold overrides routine disposal of relevant evidence
  • Collection records should make the acquisition process explainable
  • Network isolation can limit spread without immediately destroying live evidence
  • Powering down can be justified when ransomware spread cannot otherwise be stopped
  • Widespread infection may require coordinated network-level isolation
  • Isolation must remove the affected target's usable communication paths
  • Credential compromise requires containment of unauthorized access as well as hosts
  • Encryption of shared files can originate from a compromised client
  • Ransomware recovery must account for compromise that preceded encryption
  • Backups and rebuild assets need validation before restoration
  • Recovery environments should admit only systems established to be clean
  • Restoration order must account for critical services and their dependencies
  • Release from isolation requires evidence that remediation is adequate
  • Successful restoration includes validation of the business service
  • Monitoring restored systems helps confirm that recovery remains sound
  • Root cause analysis explains the conditions that enabled the incident
  • Root cause conclusions must be supported by the available evidence
  • Corrective actions should address the weaknesses established by the investigation
  • Corrective actions need ownership and follow-through
  • Incident closure follows defined criteria and completed documentation

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References

  1. https://www.comptia.org/en-us/certifications/cybersecurity-analyst/v4/
  2. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r3.pdf
  3. https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide
  4. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf
  5. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-84.pdf
  6. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-86.pdf
  7. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-92.pdf
  8. https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Logging_Cheat_Sheet.html
  9. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-150.pdf
  10. https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-03/Joint-Guidance-Identifying-and-Mitigating-LOTL508.pdf
  11. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-184.pdf